Living Abroad, Voting as if at Home? Electoral Motivations of Expatriates[*]

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Abstract: The share of voters participating in national elections from abroad is ever-growing. Despite this, expatriates constitute one of the most understudied groups of electors. Some existing analyses have shown that expatriates support different parties than voters residing at home. However, the reasons for this effect remain in the dark. In this paper we test common electoral theories – socio-structural, socio-psychological and issue voting – and their relevance for voters at home and abroad. Additionally, we test if differences in voting behaviour are due to compositional or behavioural reasons. In line with previous studies, we show that expatriates support other parties, in our case left parties, than voters at home. We further show that this gap cannot be explained by the different composition of the expatriate community, but rather by their different behavioural motivations. Expatriates more often base their vote choice on their social class and religious beliefs. Partisanship voting and, to some extent issue voting are less important in the expatriate community. The findings are based on the Swiss National Election Study 2011 and additional interviews conducted among Swiss residing abroad.

Keywords: *voting behaviour, elections, external voting, expatriates, Switzerland*

Introduction

Over the past decades, an increasing number of countries allowed their citizens residing abroad to participate in national elections. Particularly through relatively recent changes in electoral laws, today almost three-quarter of the world's countries have implemented some form of external voting (Collyer 2014; Hutcheson and Arrighi 2015; Lafleur 2015; see also Ellis, Navarro, Morales, Gratschwew, and Braun 2007). The burgeoning migration contributes to the growing importance of the phenomenon. Even in net immigration countries, expatriates may form a sizeable group of electors. For instance, over ten percent of Swiss citizens live outside their home country, which means that Swiss expatriates would constitute the third largest electoral district in the country (FDFA 2018).[1] Despite this, most knowledge on expatriate voting is either anecdotal or purely descriptive. In electoral research, it is hard to perceive of a similarly large group of voters that is as understudied as the citizens living abroad.

Some analyses indicate that expatriates support different parties than their fellow citizens at home (Fidrmuc & Doyle 2006; Lafleur & Sánchez-Domínguez 2015). On the one hand, this can mean that citizens abroad vote more strongly for the incumbent party or candidate than fellow citizens at home. Evidence of such behaviour could be observed in Senegal's 2000 presidential elections, in Turkey's 2014 presidential elections and both general elections 2015, as well as in all Ecuadorian general elections since 2006 (Boccagni & Ramírez 2013; Ellis et al. 2007; Mencütek 2015). On the other hand, citizens abroad may be also more in favour of the opposition parties. For instance, in the 2006 Italian elections, expatriates have provided the center-left coalition with a slim majority of the votes for the Senate (Battiston & Mascitelli 2008). Similarly, Lawson (2003) showed that the Mexican diaspora living in New York is more likely to support opposition parties. However, the reasons for this different voting behaviour between expatriates and citizens at home are yet unknown. It may be that the common electoral theories – socio-structural, socio-psychological and issue voting – play a different role for voters living in their home country than for those residing abroad. The underlying mechanism for the differential impact of these

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[1]Switzerland is divided in 26 electoral districts (Cantons). Their population size ranges from nearly 1,500,000 (Zürich) to 16,000 (Appenzell Innerrhoden).

theories can be structural and/or behavioural. In case of a *structural impact*, the non-identical social composition of expatriates compared to citizens living at home is to the benefit of parties favoured by a group that is overrepresented among expatriates. Independent of such structural differences, expatriates may simply *behave differently* and employ other decision making strategies than citizens at home. This speaks to a vast literature claiming that voting behaviour is shaped by the context (e.g. Anderson 2007; Carmines & Huckfeldt 1998).

Investigating the case of Switzerland, this paper makes a twofold contribution. First, it shows that expatriates support different parties than voters residing in Switzerland. Existing studies mostly analyse expatriates residing in one or very few specific foreign countries or cities (e.g. Boccagni 2011; Escobar, Arana, & McCann 2015; Lafleur & Sánchez-Domínguez 2015; Lawson 2003; Leal, Lee, & McCann 2012). Presuming that different locations attract different people – meaning that geographical dispersion of expatriates represents their diversity (Hutcheson & Arrighi 2015) – it is doubtful that such studies can grasp the electoral preferences of a country's entire diaspora. The present analysis adds to existing research in that it includes expatriate voters around the world and sheds light on external voting in a Western European democracy. We argue that our results are relevant for other countries with similar economic and institutional structures. Similar to other member states of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Switzerland scores high on economic development and is committed to the market economy. It has a long-standing democratic experience and holds free elections on a regular basis. Moreover, most political parties have long histories which means that expatriates are familiar with them, even if they emigrated from Switzerland a long time ago.

Second, the paper demonstrates the varying impact of common electoral theories between Swiss living at home and those living abroad. It shows that the differences in voting behaviour are not an artefact of group composition. If one holds the composition of the expatriates and the Swiss living at home constant, party preferences remain different. This underscores that the different voting behaviour is mainly based on behavioural reasons. More so than those living at home, expatriates base their decision on their social class and religious beliefs. Partisanship

voting and, to some extent, issue ownership voting, is less prevalent for Swiss living abroad than for Swiss living at home.

On Expatriate Voters

Investigating the voting behaviour of emigrants in their home country elections is a new field of electoral research.[2] Presumably, this is due to the low importance of the phenomenon in the past and to the scant data on expatriate voters (cf. Lafleur 2015). During the course of growing globalisation, an increasing number of countries has parts of their citizens living outside their home country. Tager calls this development "political globalization" (2006: 35). For expatriates, the opportunity to vote from abroad is essential to fulfil one of their most important civic rights, the participation in elections. Collyer (2014) lists a total of 129 countries (out of 183), whose citizens have the right of external voting in all or at least some elections (legislative, presidential, referendums, etc.). This right is most widespread in Europe, but also common in the majority of countries in other regions of the world (Ellis et al. 2007).

The growing interest in external voting transpires from different studies covering the various aspects of external voting. Early work has dealt with the legal framework of external voting (Nohlen & Grotz 2000). Other studies have focussed on normative considerations related to the introduction of external voting (Bauböck 2005, 2007; López-Guerra 2005; Spiro 2006) or explained the introduction of external voting rights (Caramani & Grotz 2015; Collyer 2014; Hartmann 2015; Lafleur 2015). Another strand of research looks at empirical aspects and patterns of voting from abroad. This field includes registration procedures, parliamentary representation and the impact of external voting on the final election results (e.g. Tager 2006), but also the underlying reasons for the participation in elections and people's voting choice (e.g. Escobar et al. 2015; Lafleur & Sánchez-Domínguez 2015; Lawson 2003; Leal et al. 2012).

Analyses examining turnout in the expatriate community come to different conclusions about the most relevant variables. Depending on the countries and items included, the drivers of participation are gender (being male), age (curvilinear), a higher income, better education,

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[2]In the remainder of the article, expatriate voting and external voting are used interchangeably.

a longer foreign residence, higher political interest and pre-migration political participation (Escobar et al. 2015; Guarnizo, Portes, & Haller 2003; Lawson 2003; Leal et al. 2012; Waldinger, Soehl, & Lim 2012). Some argue that compared to contextual variables, individual factors (resources and social capital) are less important in boosting turnout (Escobar et al. 2015). Leal et al. (2012) examine the context in more detail and find that a higher percentage of the immigrant population and presence of local-language media (Spanish) increases turnout in Mexican presidential elections (see also Lawson 2003).

Only scant research investigated party choice among expatriate voters. In the case of Mexicans living in the U.S., Lawson (2003) finds first that higher identification with the host society weakens partisan attachments back home. A second finding is that Mexicans in the U.S. with a partisan preference have a higher probability to favour the opposition, especially those who are better integrated into the U.S. society and with fewer contacts to friends and family in Mexico. In contrast, the authors find it hard to determine factors that lead to differences in electoral preference between Mexicans at home and in the U.S. In an analysis on emigrated Bolivians, Lafleur and Sánchez-Domínguez (2015) test the importance of different voting models. They find common factors such as education, ethnic background and ideology to be significant determinants of the voting decision among expatriate Bolivian voters. Furthermore, specific variables among emigrants such as the satisfaction with their decision to emigrate and the strength of connections back home (length of stay abroad or phone calls) also play a crucial role.

Most of the existing work examines emigrants from Latin America. Although insightful, these studies do not allow a generalisation of voting patterns of emigrants across the world. One of the few analysis on European external voters examines voting behaviour of Czech and Polish emigrants (Fidrmuc & Doyle 2006). Based on aggregate data this study shows that votes from abroad differ significantly from the votes at home. Possible explanations are the strong impact of institutional features (e.g. strong/weak democracies) in the new host country and the economic level, i.e. right parties receive stronger support from migrants in economically advanced countries.

The primary focus of these studies lies on counntries with negative net migration (World Bank 2017).[3] This means that the number of immigrants is lower than the number of emigrants. Previous research suggests that emigrants from these countries share several properties such as economic hardship (Tager 2006). This is important with regard to our analysis since these conditions might not only cause people to leave their country but also pre-determine their voting behaviour that differs to their fellow citizens back home. Given the stronger ties between countries developed in the second half of the 20th century, emigration may be inspired by other additional, non-economic motivations. As a result, more and more countries have substantial parts of their voting-eligible population living abroad. The analysis of expatriate voting in these countries with a substantial, but still comparatively low share of emigrants is thus very relevant today.

By analysing Switzerland, we focus o a country with a positive net migration rate.[4] Positive net migration rates are common in Europe, Central Asia and North America (World Bank 2017). Despite these numbers, Switzerland has a significant share of its citizens living abroad. Over 10 percent of the Swiss live abroad. Compared to the member states of the European Union, this is a slight above-average value (Hutcheson & Arrighi 2015)[5]. Given the positive net migration and the average share of emigrants, Switzerland serves as a representative of other European or Western countries.

Switzerland introduced external voting in 1992.[6] The system allows emigrants to vote from abroad for the home district where they last resided before leaving the country. According to Collyer (2014), this is by far the most common system of external voting (see also Collyer & Vathi 2007). When moving to a foreign country, Swiss citizens are obliged to register with a diplomatic or consular representation abroad. Once this is done, Swiss nationals can register to exercise their political rights. The expatriates get the polling material via postal mail. They can either return their ballot by mail or they can hand it in personally, if they happen to be in Switzerland

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[3]An exception is the Czech Republic (positive net migration since 1982) and Italy (positive net migration since 1987) (World Bank 2017).

[4]In 2011, the year of the national election analysed, 29,765 Swiss citizens emigrated while 140,508 foreigners immigrated to Switzerland (BfS 2018a).

[5]11 member states have higher shares of emigrants, 17 member states see lower shares of emigrants.

[6]For detailed information on Swiss expatriates and expatriate voting, see the web page of the Organisation of the Swiss Abroad: `https://www.aso.ch/en`.

during the time of the election. In 10 out of 26 districts, expatriates can moreover cast their ballot online. Given that most Swiss Citizens cast their ballot via postal mail, expatriates do not face significantly higher barriers to participate in an election. However, they have to mail the ballot at their own expenses, which is usually more expensive than using the postal service within Switzerland. An important difference is that Swiss abroad are usually only allowed to participate in national votes and elections.[7] This means that they still are called to the ballot box as many times as Swiss living at home (the national and sub-state election dates are the same), but they will vote on less issues than their fellow citizens at home.

Three Models of (External) Voting

This contribution concentrates on explanatory variables commonly found in the electoral behaviour literature. This approach enables us to first test the relative strength of different voting models among the group of expatriates and in a second step allows for a comparison of these models between Swiss expatriates and their fellow citizens back home. For the theoretical reasoning we partly also rely on theories and findings from the literature on transnationalism, particularly the competing *resocialization* and *complementarity* perspectives (Chaudary 2018).

Like Lafleur and Sánchez-Domínguez (2015), we focus on the three major schools of electoral research. Our first model examines the idea of the *Columbia School* (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & MacPhee 1954; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet 1944). This socio-structural approach proposes that social characteristics, i.e. one's religion or social class, translate into voting preferences. These social characteristics, though, are less important as individual factors, but develop their strength by embedding a person in a social structure or group, from which this person receives relevant information and accordingly forms electoral decisions. At first glance, one could expect that social-group belongings may be less relevant for people living abroad in the sense of a non-existence or very small size of a given social group in their new country of residence, i.e. a certain church congregation. Such an expectation is in line with the *resocialization* perspective

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[7]In 14 of the 26 Swiss cantons, expatriate Swiss are excluded from participating in sub-state elections and referendums.

which expects that emigrants socialize into the new host society and hence their old (social) loyalties may play less of a role (Chaudary 2018; Guarnizo et al. 2003).

However, a second central aspect of the socio-structural approach may counteract this expectation, namely a person's early and enduring socialisation in Switzerland. Given the natural lack of one's former social environment in the new host country, politically active expatriates may particularly rely on their pre-migration socialisation that links their social group belonging to a given party preference. In addition, the often reported decline of cleavages due to issue-voting or candidate characteristics might be less strong among Swiss living abroad. Specific issues currently debated in Switzerland or preferences for certain candidates are less important when residing abroad, so that expatriates rely more on traditional voting habits such as the early learned social-group identification. Further and in line with the *complementarity* perspective, a successful social incorporation in the host country, e.g. having a new, but similar church congregation as at home, is said to increase transnational political engagement (Chaudary 2018), potentially including socio-structural voting loyalties.

H1: Socio-structural voting is more important for Swiss living abroad than for Swiss living in Switzerland.

Our second model follows the *Michigan School* by A. Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960). In their socio-psychological approach political attitudes of each citizen and her experience with the political system influence voting behaviour. The authors' main concept to explain the voting decision is party identification. During childhood people acquire a party identification, which afterwards becomes an enduring component of the voters' identity. Similar to the socio-structural approach one could expect a stronger influence of partisanship for expatriates as they rely on old habits acquired in Switzerland. However, the relationship might be more complex as partisanship consists of two components, namely direction and intensity (J. E. Campbell, Munro, Alford, & Campbell 1986). Especially the latter needs regular updates through experiences in the political system. Following Converse, "partisanship would increase as a direct function of length of personal experience in the system" (1969: 152).

Despite the possibility to access all major Swiss news outlets online and independent of the location, Swiss living abroad tend to consume less media than Swiss living abroad.[8] This could indicate that Swiss living abroad are less informed about the day-to-day business in Swiss politics. Moreover, due to the weaker direct involvement in the political system, i.e. through participation in local events or discussing current issues with neighbours or colleagues, the impact of partisanship on voting behaviour might be weaker in the case of citizens living abroad. In contrast to the socio-structural approach where the early socialization is defined as a stable factor, early developed partisanship needs regular updates to preserve its impact on the voting decision. In the same vein, the process of political resocialization in the host society should further weaken former political loyalties (Chaudary 2018; Guarnizo et al. 2003). Additionally and as argued by Jones-Correa (1998: 132), after living for years in another country, emigrants may struggle to be strong partisans as this implies picking a side. Similar as to forming loyalties to the new host country and thus losing some of their old loyalties, former partisanship may also weaken. Based on all these arguments, we expect expatriates to be less influenced by partisanship.

> *H2: Socio-psychological voting (partisanship) is less important for Swiss living abroad*
> *than for Swiss living in Switzerland.*

The third model has its origin in the economic theories of voting, often named the *rational-choice approach* (Downs 1957). Similar to the socio-structural model, the voter's self-interest is the main driver of her electoral behaviour. A Citizen evaluates parties and selects the option that maximizes her utility. In this article, we focus on a simple form of issue voting, namely issue ownership voting. Issue ownership builds on the idea that parties have a reputation of issue handling competence.[9] In line with rational choice, voters want to see important problems fixed (i.e. increase their utility). In other words, they see elections as an opportunity to resolve problems. They are however reluctant to deal with the specifics of a solution and to impose

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[8]Unfortunately, the answer categories on the question about media consumption are not the same in the two questionnaires. However, while 86 percent of the Swiss living in Switzerland claim to read the political section of the newspaper at least once a week, the share of Swiss abroad doing the same thing amounts to only 64 percent. Similarly, the share of Swiss reading the newspaper on a daily basis is 7 percentage points higher when they reside in Switzerland (34 vs. 27 percent).

[9]Note that issue ownership theory contains an individual-level and party-level component. Since we are dealing with vote choice, we do not discuss the party-level implications of the theory.

ideological consistency on issues (Petrocik 1996: 826). Since the path breaking studies by Petrocik (1996) and RePass (1971), issue ownership voting experienced increasing attention over the past years (Bellucci 2006; Green & Hobolt 2008; Johns 2011; Lachat 2011; Lanz & Sciarini 2016; Walgrave, Lefevere, & Tresch 2012). These studies consistently find that citizens' evaluations of party competence have a strong impact on their vote choice (but see van der Brug 2004).

We expect that expatriates use issue ownership less often in the decision making process than Swiss living at home. On the one hand, external voters are said to be "an electorate that is generally less informed and more remotely affected by elections than their counterparts residing in the country" (Hutcheson & Arrighi 2015: 887). Swiss living abroad arguably need more effort to stay informed about important problems in their home country, so that issue ownership voting is less fast and less frugal than for Swiss living at home. On the other hand, and potentially even more relevant is the possibility that voters abroad, due to their weaker direct experience, might not have as clear opinions about one most important problem as their fellow voters at home do. This may then diminish the relevance of issue-ownership voting due to the lack of one clear pressing problem that needs to be tackled.

> *H3: Issue-ownership voting is less important for Swiss living abroad than for Swiss living in Switzerland.*

So far we have discussed the three voting models without separating structural, i.e. compositional, and behavioural effects. Structural and behavioural reasons, though, may be of different relevance for the assumed differences between Swiss living at home and Swiss expatriates. A stronger representation of a relevant group from one of our three models in only one of the two electorates, at home or abroad, may already result in a significant difference in the impact of a given voting theory and eventually leads to different party preferences. Assuming equal voting behaviour of certain social groups for a moment, an example would be that in Switzerland a large group of active Catholics could drive the importance of religious voting. In contrast, Swiss living abroad may consist of much fewer active Catholics, so that religious voting plays a less important role. Different party preferences abroad and at home would then only result from the differences in the share of active Catholics living abroad and in Switzerland.

Contrarily, the share of active Catholics in Switzerland and abroad might be very similar. Still, we may find different voting preferences. Given the similar shares of Catholics abroad and at home, such differences must then be because of different behavioural motivations of Catholics in Switzerland and abroad. These behavioural differences represent the different importance of being Catholic for the voting decision abroad and at home. Other factors important for the vote choice – especially prominent abroad or at home – might decrease the religious relevance in only one of the two electorates, so that we see different voting patterns due to behavioural reasons. Generally, both the composition of an electorate and its behaviour are interrelated, i.e. a simple overrepresentation of a given group without a related common group voting behaviour should not result in differences between voters at home and abroad. Both structural and behavioural factors may be jointly responsible for differences between Swiss at home and abroad, or only one of the two factors may stand out as being responsible for different voting preferences. Clear expectations regarding the relevance of structural and/or behavioural effects are hard to formulate without knowing the electorates' compositions and the homogeneity of the groups' decision-making strategies. We thus refrain from postulating explicit hypotheses about the significance of structural and/or behavioural effects. Important is that we are able to separate both effects to see to what extent both or only one effect matters.

Data

The availability of survey data for people voting from abroad is rare. For the national elections 2011 in Switzerland, the Swiss electoral studies project (SELECTS) collected data not only among citizens residing in Switzerland, but also for those residing abroad.[10] Both datasets are based on similar questionnaires, which allows comparing Swiss citizens in their home country with those living abroad. Some specific questions were added for Swiss expatriates and other questions were not asked, but the items of interest for this research were asked in the same way in both surveys.

The standard post-election survey in Switzerland was done using CATI interviews. The Federal Statistical Office drew a random sample of all eligible voters in Switzerland, who were then

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[10]Data available on `https://forscenter.ch/projects/selects/`.

contacted by a survey company. The final dataset includes 4,391 citizens. Since the dataset includes an overrepresentation of smaller electoral districts, we use design weights in the analysis. Compared to this standard survey, the survey mode and recruiting was slightly different in the case of the expatriates.

For reasons of data protection the survey on the expatriates was conducted in collaboration with the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA). The FDFA has a database of all registered Swiss citizens who live abroad and are eligible to vote (around 130,000 persons). Since the recruitment happened via email, the information of an email address was crucial. For around half of the registered Swiss expatriates an email was available. Among these persons the FDFA drew a random sample of 7,000 people, who received a personal invitation to participate in the survey by the FDFA. The survey itself was an online survey. In the final dataset 1,629 Swiss citizens living abroad are included. Given the low response rate and the requirement of having a registered email address, the expatriate survey is not a perfect probability sample, but rather a convenience sample (see also Germann & Serdült 2014; Lutz 2012). Despite the characteristics of a convenience sample, the representativeness check by the SELECTS project investigators showed no noteworthy bias in the final sample (FORS 2012). Throughout the descriptive analysis we use weights (for turnout and vote choice) and/or include variables affected by selection bias such as education or age in the regression models. This should weaken the potential selection problems (e.g. Sciarini & Goldberg 2017). The Swiss abroad sample has the advantage of not being restricted to a certain host country/city as it is the case for other existing expatriate datasets. The Swiss expatriates recruit themselves from a 120 different residing countries. This representative character regarding the variety of potential host countries across the world is important as the restriction to specific host countries could systemically bias voting patterns.

Operationalisation

Our outcome variable is PARTY CHOICE. The survey question asks respondents about their party choice for the National Council.[11] We will consider the seven biggest and most important parties.

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[11] The National Council is the Lower House of Switzerland. Its 200 members are elected in open list PR-elections.

The four biggest parties SVP (Swiss People's Party), SPS (Social Democratic Party), FDP (Free Democratic Party, The Liberals) and CVP (Christian Democratic People's Party) are usually represented in the government. In addition, we include the GPS (Green Party), GLP (Green Liberal Party) and BDP (Conservative Democratic Party). Together, these parties represent 92 percent of the vote shares in the 2011 national election (see also table 2). Other parties and non-voters are not included in the analysis.

As input variables for the *socio-structural model* we use the two traditionally most important predictors of voting: RELIGION combines the two common variables of denomination and church attendance. The two main groups of Protestants and Catholics were split according to their religious activity (more or less than once a year attending church) plus a fifth category merging the smallest group of people with another denomination and the ever growing group of people with no denomination (five categories: other/no denomination, non-active Protestant, active Protestant, non-active Catholic and active Catholic). SOCIAL CLASS is measured according to the Oesch (2006) scheme (eight categories: socio-cultural specialists, service workers, technical specialists, production workers, managers/administrators, clerks, liberal professions/large employers and small business owners). For the *socio-psychological model* we use PARTISANSHIP (nine categories: feeling close to any of the seven big parties plus others or no such feeling). Finally, for the *issue-ownership model* we use voters' evaluation of party competence. Respondents first indicate the most pressing problem the country is currently facing (What do you think is the most important political problem facing Switzerland today?). One could argue that the more relevant problem is the voter's personal most pressing issue. Unfortunately, the questionnaire does not distinguish between sociotropic and egocentric problems.[12] In a second step, voters are asked to identify the MOST COMPETENT PARTY to handle this issue (eight categories: seven big parties plus others). This variable is widely used in electoral research (Clarke, Sanders, C, & Whiteley 2009; Lachat 2011; Pardos-Prado 2012).

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[12]Moreover, in line with Wlezien (2005) we acknowledge that the salience part of the question is ambiguous since it might rather capture what is in the voter's mind than the actual salience of an issue. However, since we are studying individual-level (voter-level) effects, measuring the voter's personal perception is arguably more relevant than the general relevance of an issue.

To circumvent the risk of omitted variable bias, each model furthermore includes the following control variables: self-placement on the *left-right scale* (0-10), *age* (linear), *sex* (female dummy), *marital status* (married, single and widowed/divorced) and *education* (low, middle and high).

The Lambda Index

To measure the importance of our three election models we use the lambda index (Lachat 2007a, 2007b). This index indicates how homogeneous different (social) groups vote for a specific party. Based on the lambda index we assess how strongly socio-structural variables, party identification and competence assignment are related to the vote decision.

The first step in calculating the lambda index is to estimate multinomial logistic regressions. We run three separate models for each of the two datasets (Swiss expatriates and Swiss living in Switzerland). As we have two different variables of interest in our socio-structural model (religion and social class), we will get one lambda score for each of these variables. For the socio-psychological (partisanship) and the issue-ownership (party competence) models, we get two additional lambda scores.[13] The input variables for our models are included as dummies, meaning that one dummy category per variable is omitted in the actual calculation. Based on the regression coefficients of the multinomial models, we estimate the probability of each group (category) to vote for the seven parties.[14] The lambda is based on these predicted probabilities and can be specified as follows:

$$\lambda_{absolute} = \sqrt{\sum_{j=1}^{J} \sum_{s=1}^{S} \omega_j \omega_s \left(\pi_s^j - \overline{\pi}_s^j \right)^2}$$

with j representing the seven main parties and s being the categories of our input variables (e.g. the five religious groups). The probability that a member of group s votes party j is represented by π_s^j and the average of these voting probabilities $\overline{\pi}_s^j$ is defined as $\sum_{s=1}^{S} \omega_s \pi_s^j$. The ω_s represents

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[13]Unfortunately, running a complete model, i.e. including all variables from our three models plus controls, is not feasible due to the low number of observations.

[14]This is done with the package `cindex` for STATA: http://www.romain-lachat.ch/software.html. For the SELECTS survey we use the modified version `cindexw`, which allows to include (design) weights.

the proportion of voters belonging to group s and ω_j represents the estimated vote share of party j.[15]

Put differently, the lambda adds up weighted deviations from the average distribution of voters per group and party (Goldberg & Sciarini 2014: 579). Unlike the kappa index (Hout, Brooks, & Manza 1995), from which the lambda index evolved, the lambda takes into account the size of a party and the size of the input-variable group (Lachat 2007b: 18). The resulting index takes values between 0 and 0.5. High values indicate a homogeneous voting behaviour in the groups, i.e. each group votes for its "own" party. Imagine for instance a world with two parties (1, 2) and two groups (A, B): If all citizens from group A vote for party 1 and all citizens from group B vote for party 2, the lambda would produce the maximum value of 0.5. If however some voters from group A vote for party 2 (or some citizens from group B vote for 1), the lambda decreases.

The expected different voting behaviour between Swiss expatriates and home-based voters may be due to actual behavioural differences in voting and/or simply due to a different (social) composition of both electorates. The lambda index allows to disentangle these two sources of different electoral outcomes. For doing so, one can weigh the calculated voting probabilities $(\pi_s^j - \overline{\pi}_s^j)$ of Swiss expatriates with the aggregated structure (size) of groups found among Swiss living at home (ω_s). For instance, when running the models to examine the effect of religion, the weighting procedure leads to an exact match between the aggregate composition of Swiss voters at home and abroad, e.g. same amount of active Catholics in both electorates. By having the same size of the corresponding groups in both datasets, the score of the lambda represent only differences in terms of diverging behaviour. For each variable of interest we will thus present three lambdas each, one for Swiss-based voters, one for Swiss expatriates with their actual group composition and an adjusted one for Swiss expatriates with the same composition as their fellow home-based voters.

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[15]For both the calculation of the predicted probabilities for a certain party choice and the subsequent computation of confidence intervals the used program `cindexw` relies on simulation techniques. First, the program simulates the distribution of the regression parameters after each model estimation. Based on these simulated parameters it computes a predicted value together with the corresponding lambda index. The retrieved information about the distribution of these indices then allows for calculation of their average value and confidence interval (Lachat 2007b).

The Expatriate Voter: A Distinct Species?

– Table 1 about here –

Let us first turn to descriptive statistics on the the expatriates in our sample. As shown in Table 1, the majority of around three quarter of the Swiss living abroad were born in Switzerland and only later on moved abroad. Among those born abroad, every third has always lived abroad. Only 7 percent of the expatriate population thus never lived in Switzerland. This is important, as it allows socialisation processes to take place before moving abroad. In contrast to countries where people move abroad mostly for economic reasons, half of the Swiss expatriates moved for private reasons and another 8 percent for their studies. Even among the 42 percent who left for professional reasons, there is probably only a very small proportion who is materially better off than in Switzerland, though we do not have more information here. A majority of the expatriates does not plan to move back in the next couple of years, which may hint to a stable foreign residence and therefore a loosening of ties to the home country. Again, this is relevant for our theoretical argument that e.g. issue ownership voting is more important the more one is concerned and affected by currently debated issues. Finally, we observe that half of the expatriates live in Europe, whereas the other half is scattered around the globe. This speaks for a heterogeneous electorate and stands in contrast to earlier studies focusing on a diaspora in only one country/city.

– Table 2 about here –

We now have a closer look at turnout and vote choice of the Swiss expatriate community. Previous studies have pointed out that, compared to citizens residing in their home country, expatriates have a lower turnout rate and select different parties. Table 2 shows that one out of two Swiss citizens living at home participated at the 2011 national election.[16] In the Swiss expatriate community, only one in three cast a vote. The low turnout rate of only 31 percent

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[16]The reported turnout rate in surveys contains a turnout bias (for a detailed discussion, see Sciarini & Goldberg 2017). The results presented in the descriptive analysis are thus weighted based on turnout and vote choice. The home dataset moreover contains design weights. Appendix A2 shows the unweighted descriptive analyses.

mirrors common findings on low expatriate participation (e.g Boccagni & Ramírez 2013; Escobar et al. 2015; Mencütek 2015).[17]

Table 2 moreover presents the vote choice of the Swiss living abroad and at home (alongside the official results in the last column). When comparing the two groups, two findings stand out: First, the center right parties FDP, CVP, and BDP get fewer support from the expatriate community than from voters residing in Switzerland. The gap between Swiss at home and Swiss abroad widens further with regard to the populist right Swiss People's Party (SVP). Second, Swiss abroad more often vote for the Social Democratic Party (SPS) and the Green Party (GPS) than Swiss living at home. The stronger support of the left parties also transpires from the ideological position of Swiss expatriates (Table 3). On an eleven-point scale, expatriates position themselves one point more to the left than voters residing in Switzerland (4.9 vs. 6.2).

– Table 3 about here –

A possible explanation for these differences is a different group composition. It builds on the idea that different (social or political) groups support different parties. Differences in electoral behaviour occur, if expatriate voters are not a random sample of the Swiss voter living at home, but differ in their composition, e.g. more young and well educated Swiss abroad. Note that in this view, the behavioural mechanisms driving the vote decision remain the same for both electorates. Table 3 summarizes the Swiss at home and Swiss abroad on a series of sociodemographic variables. The result demonstrate that the expatriate voter is indeed not representative for the average Swiss voter at home. Expatriate voters are more often male (+15%) and single (+7%) than voters residing in Switzerland. A striking difference regards education. 55 percent of the expatriate voters are highly educated, as opposed to only 33 percent of the voters at home. Finally, we observe only small differences between the two groups with regard to the linguistic community and age.

– Table 4 about here –

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[17]Escobar et al. (2015: 3,6) estimate that 95.3 percent of the potential voters living abroad did not participate at the Colombian presidential elections in 2010 (74.6% of registered expatriates). In the same election, 51 percent of the Colombians living at home turned out.

Let us now turn to the drivers of the voting decision. These variables are later used as the input variables in our models of vote choice. As for the socio-structural variables, Table 4 reveals a striking difference with regard to religion. Almost half of the Swiss living abroad do not belong to any religion or belong to a non-Christian one. Only one fourth of the Swiss living at home fall into this category. All other religious groups are underrepresented among expatriates, most strikingly the active Catholics (-11%). With regard to social class, expatriates have higher occupational skills than the Swiss living at home.[18] In other words, the share of service workers, production workers, and clerks is higher among Swiss living at home than among Swiss living abroad. Party identification as well as competence evaluation indicate that expatriates feel closer to left parties (SPS, GPS) and are less fond of the right wing SVP. With regard to the center parties (FDP, CVP, BDP, GLP), the differences between the two groups are more subtle.

In sum, the descriptive results show that expatriate voters indeed support different parties than citizens residing in Switzerland. Moreover, the descriptives show that the composition of the group is different in terms of social and political indicators. The following analysis will provide answers whether the different voting behaviour is thus due to compositional effects, behavioural effects or both.

Different Motivations at Home and Abroad?

Figure 1 presents four panels with lambda scores (and confidence intervals at the 0.05 level), the first two stemming from our socio-structural model plus one each for the effects of partisanship and party competence. All panels contain one score estimated for the Swiss voting at home and two for the expatriates. The first score among expatriates is the standard lambda, the second is the adjusted lambda controlling for the different composition of the electorate, i.e. weighting the abroad voters to have the same aggregate composition on the variable of interest as Swiss voters at home. The exact lambda values are also displayed in Appendix A1 and the underlying models in Appendix A3. As a first result, the lambda scores differ substantially, especially the two

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[18]In his class scheme, Oesch (2006) distinguishes a vertical and a horizontal axis. The horizontal axis distinguishes between work logics (interpersonal service, technical, organizational, independent). The vertical axis separates high from low skill requirements.

socio-structural lambdas which are lower than the ones for partisanship and party competence. This points to an overall lower influence of cleavages in comparison to our two other voting models.

– Figure 1 about here –

More interesting, though, are the differences between expatriates and home-based voters for each of the four voting determinants separately. For the two cleavage lambdas the graphs show a clear difference. Generally speaking, the impact of cleavage voting is lower for Swiss voting at home than for Swiss voting abroad. Both religion and social class have a particularly low impact on voting behaviour in Switzerland. It is low too for expatriates, but still more important than for the Swiss voting at home. Due to the small number of expatriates, the confidence intervals are large. In the case of religion we can thus not speak of statistically significant differences in religiously motivated voting between the two groups of voters. In contrast, Swiss voters at home vote significantly less due to social class than their fellow Swiss abroad (significant difference to both the normal and adjusted abroad lambda).

A closer look at the adjusted lambda (third row) reveals that differences between Swiss living at home and abroad are particularly large if we simulate a scenario where the social structure is the same among the two electorates. This is especially the case for social class where the abroad lambda value is even higher for the adjusted composition (0.13) than for the actual composition (0.11). In other words, for social class, differences due to behavioural effects alone (comparing the home based and adjusted abroad voters ($0.13 - 0.06 = $ *0.07*)) are larger than looking at the total difference including both behavioural and structural effects (comparing the home based and abroad voters ($0.11 - 0.06 = $ *0.05*)).[19] Hence, the different structure between both electorates weakens the overall effect, meaning that behavioural and structural effects work

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[19] As a reading example, when comparing the first lambda (home) with the second lambda (abroad), both behavioural and structural differences are combined. Comparing the two abroad lambdas (normal and adjusted) shows only structural differences, as their voting pattern remains the same (based on the same model). In case of equal values of the two abroad values, this stands for no structural effects. Hence, comparing the lambdas between home and abroad (adjusted) results in differences only due to behaviour (as the structural composition is the same in both groups). For instance, in case of lambda values of 0.1 for home, 0.4 for abroad and 0.3 for abroad (adjusted), this would mean that the overall difference in voting of *0.3* ($0.4 - 0.1$) is mainly due to behavioural effects ($0.3 - 0.1 = $ *0.2*) and less so due to structural effects ($0.4 - 0.3 = $ *0.1*).

in opposite directions. Whereas both electorates strongly differ in the behavioural motivations, i.e. the importance of social class belonging for the decision-making, the differences in the electorates' composition dampen these effects. For instance, this could be the case when a group is strongly relying on social class for its voting decision, but is rather underrepresented among Swiss expatriates (e.g. workers voting for the SVP).

For religion, the (behavioural) difference between the adjusted expatriate lambda and the home lambda only shortly fails to reach statistical significance. Otherwise both patterns of religious and class voting are very similar. Thus, and particularly due to the strong and significant effect found for social class we confirm our first hypothesis stating that socio-structural voting is more important for Swiss living abroad.

In the second hypothesis we expect a weaker effect of partisanship voting among expatriate voters. Panel 3 in Figure 1 indeed shows strong differences between the home and abroad lambda measures. The difference between the lambda of the home-voters and the adjusted abroad-lambda is statistically significant. This means that Swiss living at home base their decision significantly more often on partisanship than Swiss expatriates. Comparing the home lambda with the adjusted abroad one stands only for behavioural differences. This means again that compositional factors in terms of partisan preference do not play a major role and rather weaken the total difference by running counter the effect of behavioural differences. Nevertheless, the significant differences in terms of behaviour between both electorates strongly support our second hypothesis.

Finally, the last panel shows the differing impact of issue-ownership voting. Again, and in line with our expectations, one can see a stronger influence among home based voters. However, this time voters living abroad are more similar to voters at home. Additionally, both abroad lambdas are very similar standing again for no influence of structural effects. Hence, although the weaker impact of issue-ownership voting among expatriates goes in the proposed direction, the results fail to reach statistical significance and do not allow to confirm the expectation formulated in our third hypothesis.[20]

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[20]As robustness checks we calculated all lambda indices based on the same models plus including the residence continent as a binary control (Europe vs. rest; lambda values not displayed). All found patterns from Figure 1

Conclusion

Expatriate voting has become increasingly important over the last decades. The drivers of this development are twofold. On the one hand, we observe an ever-growing number of citizens living outside their home country. On the other hand, countries have extended the rights of expatriates to participate in national elections. Despite this, little is known about expatriate voters. Who are they? How many of them are using their right to vote? Which mechanisms explain their electoral decisions? The aim of this paper was to find answers to these important questions. Using rare survey data about expatriate voters from Switzerland, we compared characteristics and voting behaviour of voters living at home and voters residing abroad. In addition to descriptive results, we specifically examined models of voting behaviour representing common theories in electoral research.

Our first model tests the impact of cleavage voting. We postulate a stronger influence of religion and social class on the vote choice among Swiss living abroad. As the links between religion or social class and voting are learned early in life and often transform into a habit, the bigger distance to current political debates in the home country may enforce the significance of cleavage voting. Our results confirm this expectation. Particularly the effects of social class are statistically significant and the ones for religion only shortly fail to reach statistical significance. This supports the idea that voters living abroad rely more heavily on socio-structural variables.

We further expect that expatriates less often base their decisions on issue ownership and partisanship than Swiss at home. Both types of voting require a fairly high level of information on current political debates and on party positions on political topics. As expatriates' exposure to Swiss media is lower, they are less informed about the specificities of issues and less involved in the political debates. Our results are in line with these assumptions. However, with regard to issue ownership voting the effects fail to reach statistical significance. In contrast, for the partisanship model we find statistical evidence that Swiss expatriate voters rely significantly

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remain stable, the only difference concerns the adjusted abroad lambda for the partisanship model, which for abroad voters in Europe just fails to be significantly different to the one of home voters at the common 0.05 level. The lambda from abroad voters residing outside Europe, though, still differs significantly at the 0.05 significance level.

less on their partisanship in their decision-making process. Moreover, this is no artefact of a different partisan composition between both electorates (i.e. younger left-leaning people tend to live more often abroad), as for partisanship voting all of the found difference is due to behavioural differences. In general, while separating both possible sources, we found that behavioural effects are responsible for the different voting patterns between voters abroad and at home, and not structural effects. Although the electorates also (strongly) differ in their structural composition, the related effects mostly dampened the overall found differences between home-based and abroad voters.

This study analyses expatriate voting in only one of over 100 countries that allow expatriates to vote in national elections. While others have shown the value of single country studies in the field of migration research (e.g. Paarlberg 2017), we thus provide solely a first step to arrive at more general conclusions about expatriate voting. Still, our results offer valuable insights into the composition of and motivations of expatriate voters. Citizens living abroad are not a random subsample of the home-based population and thus deserve specific attention. This is interesting from a scientific perspective, but may also become more crucial from a party perspective regarding specific campaign strategies aiming at expatriates. Such campaigns may be especially worthwhile as we have shown that expatriates' different voting patterns compared to home-based voters mainly stem from behavioural differences. Parties would not have any chance to alternate the expatriates' composition if that would have been the main driver of different voting behaviour. However, behaviour can be externally influenced and hence the expatriate community may increasingly come into the focus of parties' campaign strategies.

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Tables/Figures

Table 1: Descriptives: expatriate-specific information

BIRTH PLACE ($N = 1{,}550$)	
Switzerland	77%
Abroad	23%
ALWAYS LIVED ABROAD ($N = 1{,}548$)	
No	93%
Yes	7%
REASON FOR MOVING ABROAD ($N = 1{,}166$)	
Professional	42%
Studies	8%
Private	50%
PLANS TO MOVE BACK IN NEXT YEARS ($N = 998$)	
No	67%
Yes	33%
CONTINENT OF RESIDENCE ($N = 1{,}549$)	
Europe	49%
Africa	6%
South America	6%
North America	14%
Asia	18%
Oceania	7%

Note: Voters and non-voters included.

Table 2: Descriptives: participation and vote choice

	HOME	ABROAD	Δ	OFFICIAL
PARTICIPATION ($N = 4{,}377 \: / \: 1{,}522$)				
No	51%	69%	+18%	51%
Yes	49%	31%	-18%	49%
VOTE CHOICE ($N = 2{,}728 \: / \: 634$)				
SVP	29%	23%	-7%	27%
SPS	20%	27%	+7%	19%
FDP	16%	14%	-2%	15%
CVP	13%	9%	-4%	12%
GPS	9%	17%	+8%	8%
GLP	6%	6%	±0%	5%
BDP	6%	4%	-2%	5%

Note: Weighted results (design, turnout, vote choice). Last column represent official results (BfS 2018b).

Table 3: Descriptives: sociodemographic variables

	HOME	ABROAD	Δ
SEX (N = 2,728 / 641)			
Male	50%	65%	+15%
Female	50%	35%	-15%
MARITAL STATUS (N = 2,693 / 625)			
Single	23%	30%	+7%
Married	64%	59%	-5%
Widowed/Divorced	14%	11%	-3%
EDUCATION (N = 2,716 / 591)			
Low	47%	19%	-28%
Medium	30%	27%	-3%
High	22%	55%	+33%
LANGUAGE (N = 2,728 / 643)			
German	77%	77%	±0%
French	20%	18%	-2%
Italian	4%	5%	+1%
AGE (N = 2,728 / 641)	53	49	-4
LEFT (0) RIGHT (10) POSITION (N = 2,728 / 591)	6.2	4.9	-1.3

Note: Only voters included. Weighted results (design, turnout, vote choice).
Age = mean value.

Table 4: Descriptives: determinants of the vote

	HOME	ABROAD	Δ
RELIGION (*N* = 2,718 / 557)			
No/other denomination	25%	48%	+23%
Non-active Protestant	17%	16%	-1%
Active Protestant	16%	11%	-5%
Non-active Catholic	16%	11%	-5%
Active Catholic	26%	15%	-11%
SOCIAL CLASS (*N* = 2,502 / 509)			
Socio-cultural specialists	18%	16%	-2%
Service workers	10%	2%	-8%
Technical specialists	10%	12%	+2%
Production workers	11%	3%	-8%
Managers and administrators	24%	37%	+13%
Clerks	11%	5%	-6%
Liberal professions / large employers	4%	12%	+8%
Small business owners	12%	12%	±0%
PARTISANSHIP (*N* = 2,689 / 551)			
SVP	22%	17%	-5%
SPS	20%	25%	+5%
FDP	13%	15%	+2%
CVP	10%	7%	-3%
GPS	7%	14%	+7%
GLP	6%	7%	+1%
BDP	4%	3%	-1%
None	16%	11%	-5%
Other party	2%	1%	-1%
ISSUE COMPETENCE EVALUATION (*N* = 1,857 / 478)			
SVP	28%	22%	-6%
SPS	18%	24%	+6%
FDP	12%	14%	+2%
CVP	7%	4%	-3%
GPS	7%	6%	-1%
GLP	8%	6%	-2%
BDP	4%	4%	±0%
Other party	16%	20%	+4%

Note: Only voters included. Weighted results (design, turnout, vote choice).

Figure 1: Lambda (λ) scores for the different models

A1 Lambda

Table A1: Lambda measures for different voting models

	HOME	ABROAD	ABROAD (const. struc.)
SOCIO-STRUCTURAL MODEL			
Religion	0.057	0.104	0.119
Social class	**0.061**	**0.109**	**0.131**
SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL			
Partisanship	**0.269**	0.202	**0.181**
ISSUE-OWNERSHIP MODEL			
Party competence	0.198	0.153	0.152

Note: Bold values stand for a significant difference (0.05 level).

A2 Unweighted sociodemographic descriptives

Table A2: Descriptives: participation and vote choice

	HOME	ABROAD	Δ
PARTICIPATION ($N = 4{,}377 \, / \, 1{,}522$)			
No	26%	51%	+25%
Yes	74%	49%	-25%
VOTE CHOICE ($N = 2{,}728 \, / \, 634$)			
SVP	22%	12%	-10%
SPS	27%	26%	-1%
FDP	16%	23%	+7%
CVP	13%	9%	-4%
GPS	8%	12%	+4%
GLP	7%	13%	+6%
BDP	7%	5%	-2%

Note: Design weights applied for home voters.

Table A3: Descriptives: determinants of the vote

	HOME	ABROAD	Δ
RELIGION ($N = 2{,}718$ / 557)			
No/other denomination	25%	47%	+23%
Non-active Protestant	15%	16%	+1%
Active Protestant	14%	11%	-3%
Non-active Catholic	17%	11%	-6%
Active Catholic	28%	15%	-13%
SOCIAL CLASS ($N = 2{,}502$ / 509)			
Socio-cultural specialists	19%	16%	-3%
Service workers	9%	3%	-6%
Technical specialists	10%	12%	+2%
Production workers	10%	2%	-8%
Managers and administrators	24%	39%	+15%
Clerks	12%	6%	-6%
Liberal professions / large employers	4%	11%	7%
Small business owners	11%	10%	-1%
COMPETENCE ASSIGNMENT ($N = 1{,}857$ / 478)			
SVP	22%	13%	-9%
SPS	22%	24%	+2%
FDP	12%	20%	+8%
CVP	7%	4%	-3%
GPS	7%	5%	-2%
GLP	8%	9%	+1%
BDP	5%	4%	-1%
Other party	17%	20%	+3%
PARTISANSHIP ($N = 2{,}689$ / 551)			
SVP	18%	9%	-9%
SPS	25%	25%	+0%
FDP	13%	21%	+8%
CVP	10%	8%	-2%
GPS	7%	5%	-2%
GLP	7%	11%	+4%
BDP	4%	3%	-1%
None	16%	12%	-4%
Other party	2%	1%	-1%

Note: Only voters included. Design weights applied for home voters.

A3 Multinomial logit models

Table A4: Socio-structural model for Swiss at home

	SVP	FDP	BDP	CVP	GLP	GPS
			Party choice			
RELIGION *(ref. no/other denomination)*						
Non-active Protestant	0.282	0.389	0.789*	−0.159	0.217	0.137
	(0.230)	(0.244)	(0.339)	(0.442)	(0.315)	(0.296)
Active Protestant	0.121	0.166	0.695*	0.220	0.176	−0.165
	(0.249)	(0.266)	(0.347)	(0.404)	(0.344)	(0.316)
Non-active Catholic	0.333	0.306	−0.326	1.475***	−0.240	0.045
	(0.232)	(0.256)	(0.419)	(0.325)	(0.359)	(0.301)
Active Catholic	0.462*	0.446	−0.153	2.438***	−0.343	−0.388
	(0.222)	(0.238)	(0.372)	(0.293)	(0.348)	(0.316)
SOCIAL CLASS *(ref. manager/administrator)*						
Socio-cultural specialist	−0.902***	−1.185***	−0.331	−0.339	−0.943**	0.442
	(0.268)	(0.261)	(0.377)	(0.303)	(0.336)	(0.309)
Service worker	−0.081	−0.600	−0.355	−0.029	−1.984***	0.380
	(0.319)	(0.340)	(0.467)	(0.388)	(0.575)	(0.438)
Technical specialist	−0.398	−0.403	0.110	−0.253	−0.149	0.404
	(0.274)	(0.283)	(0.407)	(0.351)	(0.351)	(0.383)
Production worker	−0.206	−0.933**	−0.055	−0.254	−1.881**	0.699
	(0.285)	(0.355)	(0.423)	(0.362)	(0.615)	(0.428)
Clerk	−0.385	−0.724*	−0.577	−0.413	−0.613	0.754
	(0.272)	(0.299)	(0.451)	(0.346)	(0.407)	(0.390)
Liberal profession/large employer	0.493	0.489	0.163	0.897*	0.205	0.609
	(0.424)	(0.369)	(0.676)	(0.449)	(0.458)	(0.607)
Small business owner	0.314	−0.199	0.009	0.316	−1.234*	0.271
	(0.279)	(0.309)	(0.416)	(0.335)	(0.575)	(0.445)
CONTROLS						
Left-right	0.679***	0.668***	0.513***	0.670***	0.492*	−0.089
	(0.175)	(0.173)	(0.127)	(0.173)	(0.237)	(0.087)
Woman	−0.117	0.358	−0.118	0.196	0.660*	0.359
	(0.175)	(0.190)	(0.257)	(0.210)	(0.304)	(0.225)
Age	−0.000	0.002	0.011	−0.003	−0.036***	−0.006
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Low education	−0.035	−0.250	0.017	−0.044	−0.448	−0.165
(ref. middle education)	(0.171)	(0.201)	(0.258)	(0.224)	(0.286)	(0.242)
High education	−1.225***	0.143	−0.890*	−0.264	0.010	0.278
	(0.236)	(0.205)	(0.359)	(0.257)	(0.283)	(0.254)
Single	0.070	−0.096	−0.620	−0.066	−0.555	0.270
(ref. married)	(0.216)	(0.217)	(0.398)	(0.268)	(0.321)	(0.281)
Widowed	−0.103	−0.361	−0.608	−0.586*	−0.153	−0.324
	(0.216)	(0.250)	(0.351)	(0.296)	(0.348)	(0.297)
Constant	−3.276***	−3.664***	−4.059***	−4.962***	−1.126	−1.209*
	(0.928)	(0.941)	(0.786)	(0.968)	(1.416)	(0.568)
N			2454			
pseudo R^2			0.18			

Note: Base outcome is SP; standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A5: Socio-psychological model for Swiss at home

	Party choice					
	SVP	FDP	BDP	CVP	GLP	GPS
PARTISANSHIP *(ref. SVP)*						
FDP	−1.827**	4.370***	2.421*	0.488	0.386	−33.375***
	(0.653)	(0.677)	(1.004)	(0.799)	(0.951)	(0.795)
BDP	19.491***	23.225***	26.784***	22.052	22.521***	−21.026***
	(0.942)	(0.968)	(1.085)	(.)	(1.123)	(0.992)
CVP	−1.866*	1.021	1.458	4.618***	−0.394	0.106
	(0.824)	(0.889)	(1.191)	(0.817)	(1.333)	(1.187)
GLP	−3.327***	0.363	1.208	−0.758	2.552**	−0.031
	(0.725)	(0.776)	(1.036)	(0.914)	(0.821)	(0.845)
SP	−7.150***	−2.820**	−1.596	−3.003**	−2.409*	−1.837*
	(1.042)	(1.053)	(1.180)	(1.044)	(1.098)	(0.862)
GPS	−5.821***	−3.447**	−1.975	−2.123	−1.097	1.809*
	(1.406)	(1.250)	(1.359)	(1.252)	(1.151)	(0.846)
Others	−2.599***	−0.070	1.356	−0.503	−0.563	0.128
	(0.695)	(0.879)	(1.115)	(0.924)	(1.099)	(0.904)
No partisanship	−2.681***	0.680	1.825*	0.505	0.216	−0.041
	(0.569)	(0.644)	(0.884)	(0.658)	(0.750)	(0.739)
CONTROLS						
Left-right	0.081	0.078	0.037	0.080	0.072	−0.113
	(0.236)	(0.235)	(0.208)	(0.236)	(0.233)	(0.130)
Woman	0.371	0.420	0.019	0.417	0.472	0.265
	(0.231)	(0.244)	(0.286)	(0.250)	(0.264)	(0.240)
Age	0.007	0.016	0.033**	0.005	−0.029**	−0.004
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Low education	−0.141	−0.178	−0.008	0.012	−0.313	−0.215
(ref. middle education)	(0.245)	(0.286)	(0.317)	(0.290)	(0.316)	(0.282)
High education	−1.217***	−0.267	−0.812	−0.478	−0.077	0.003
	(0.305)	(0.315)	(0.425)	(0.332)	(0.314)	(0.301)
Single	0.320	0.048	−0.038	0.186	−0.227	0.246
(ref. married)	(0.313)	(0.299)	(0.430)	(0.377)	(0.359)	(0.304)
Widowed	−0.344	−0.393	−0.634	−0.255	−0.096	−0.301
	(0.373)	(0.402)	(0.446)	(0.404)	(0.440)	(0.351)
Constant	2.243	−1.869	−3.754*	−1.311	0.188	−0.260
	(1.685)	(1.704)	(1.725)	(1.744)	(1.710)	(1.241)
N			2642			
pseudo R^2			0.51			

Note: Base outcome is SP; standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A6: Issue-ownership model for Swiss at home

	SVP	FDP	BDP	CVP	GLP	GPS
COMPETENCE ASSIGNMENT *(ref. SVP)*						
FDP	−2.207***	1.684**	1.574	−0.229	0.074	−38.485***
	(0.551)	(0.549)	(0.934)	(0.625)	(0.771)	(0.708)
BDP	−2.827***	−0.251	3.602***	−1.897*	−0.796	−2.632*
	(0.721)	(0.738)	(0.951)	(0.949)	(0.958)	(1.278)
CVP	−0.887	0.785	3.061**	3.787***	0.590	−1.358
	(0.714)	(0.798)	(1.080)	(0.668)	(1.060)	(1.283)
GLP	−1.811**	0.722	1.825	0.417	2.412**	0.438
	(0.591)	(0.594)	(1.035)	(0.646)	(0.744)	(0.816)
SP	−5.206***	−2.633***	−0.561	−1.741**	−2.439***	−1.486*
	(0.609)	(0.563)	(0.944)	(0.555)	(0.738)	(0.648)
GPS	−4.262***	−2.154**	−1.109	−0.799	−42.202***	1.261
	(0.792)	(0.808)	(1.141)	(0.735)	(0.699)	(0.680)
Others	−3.201***	−0.854	1.200	−0.329	−0.997	−1.297
	(0.468)	(0.502)	(0.867)	(0.516)	(0.707)	(0.685)
CONTROLS						
Left-right	0.631***	0.616***	0.560***	0.635***	0.138	−0.062
	(0.127)	(0.122)	(0.108)	(0.128)	(0.090)	(0.079)
Woman	0.117	0.390	−0.241	0.305	0.243	0.348
	(0.258)	(0.251)	(0.337)	(0.260)	(0.286)	(0.251)
Age	−0.003	0.008	0.025*	0.003	−0.039***	0.000
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Low education	−0.171	−0.060	0.631	0.026	−0.528	−0.502
(ref. middle education)	(0.272)	(0.281)	(0.367)	(0.287)	(0.352)	(0.311)
High education	−1.323***	−0.043	−0.331	−0.419	−0.450	−0.324
	(0.330)	(0.287)	(0.440)	(0.323)	(0.345)	(0.307)
Single	−0.045	−0.371	−0.111	−0.101	−0.968*	0.511
(ref. married)	(0.374)	(0.330)	(0.478)	(0.386)	(0.417)	(0.338)
Widowed	−0.375	−0.674*	−0.491	−0.281	−0.193	0.013
	(0.344)	(0.338)	(0.493)	(0.346)	(0.451)	(0.354)
Constant	−0.403	−3.491***	−6.538***	−3.577**	1.245	−0.400
	(1.033)	(1.016)	(1.189)	(1.097)	(0.962)	(0.950)
N			1824			
pseudo R^2			0.40			

Note: Base outcome is SP; standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A7: Socio-structural model for Swiss abroad

	SVP	FDP	BDP	CVP	GLP	GPS
			Party choice			
RELIGION *(ref. no/other denomination)*						
Non-active Protestant	0.514	0.639	1.404	0.106	0.246	0.124
	(0.766)	(0.619)	(0.810)	(0.973)	(0.622)	(0.593)
Active Protestant	−0.852	−0.723	−0.694	−0.281	−1.166	−2.362*
	(0.900)	(0.689)	(1.046)	(0.917)	(0.697)	(1.102)
Non-active Catholic	−0.524	0.091	0.473	1.553*	−0.397	−2.149*
	(1.154)	(0.661)	(0.863)	(0.747)	(0.647)	(1.093)
Active Catholic	−0.200	−0.030	1.194	3.064***	0.582	0.514
	(0.954)	(0.679)	(0.882)	(0.703)	(0.609)	(0.624)
SOCIAL CLASS *(ref. manager/administrator)*						
Socio-cultural specialist	−0.520	−0.683	−42.788	−0.761	−0.380	0.447
	(0.923)	(0.581)	(.)	(0.670)	(0.525)	(0.580)
Service worker	−45.755	−1.505	−1.425	−44.479	−0.839	0.874
	(.)	(1.248)	(1.541)	(.)	(1.058)	(0.941)
Technical specialist	−1.446	−0.514	0.965	−0.164	−0.011	1.043
	(1.015)	(0.678)	(0.906)	(0.779)	(0.628)	(0.705)
Production worker	−0.700	−43.661	0.534	−1.508	−0.304	1.654
	(1.846)	(.)	(1.542)	(1.667)	(1.354)	(1.116)
Clerk	−1.730	−0.715	−0.019	−0.922	−0.862	0.355
	(1.523)	(0.986)	(1.117)	(1.001)	(0.884)	(0.894)
Liberal profession/large employer	0.532	0.084	1.798	−0.521	0.244	1.307
	(0.956)	(0.785)	(0.984)	(0.999)	(0.776)	(0.771)
Small business owner	0.722	−0.223	1.428	−0.847	−1.811	0.800
	(0.941)	(0.799)	(0.911)	(1.040)	(1.167)	(0.787)
CONTROLS						
Left-right	2.468***	1.694***	1.347***	1.428***	0.949***	0.527***
	(0.224)	(0.169)	(0.200)	(0.183)	(0.151)	(0.146)
Woman	−0.178	−0.051	0.782	0.341	−0.324	0.527
	(0.635)	(0.450)	(0.608)	(0.536)	(0.445)	(0.428)
Age	−0.034	−0.030	−0.053*	−0.006	−0.086***	−0.020
	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.018)
Low education	0.595	−0.710	0.619	0.289	−0.728	−0.910
(ref. middle education)	(0.857)	(0.727)	(0.810)	(0.818)	(0.724)	(0.774)
High education	−0.772	0.093	−0.827	0.117	−0.153	0.157
	(0.670)	(0.513)	(0.698)	(0.628)	(0.499)	(0.538)
Single	0.883	0.050	−0.224	0.858	−0.180	0.753
(ref. Married)	(0.781)	(0.525)	(0.818)	(0.595)	(0.487)	(0.474)
Widowed	1.864*	0.655	1.480	0.825	0.953	−0.543
	(0.942)	(0.756)	(0.904)	(0.923)	(0.731)	(0.892)
Constant	−11.679***	−5.340***	−5.044**	−7.410***	0.774	−2.246
	(1.850)	(1.222)	(1.618)	(1.478)	(1.153)	(1.177)
N			442			
pseudo R^2			0.38			

Note: Base outcome is SP; standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A8: Socio-psychological model for Swiss abroad

| | Party choice | | | | | |
	SVP	FDP	BDP	CVP	GLP	GPS
PARTISANSHIP *(ref. SVP)*						
FDP	−23.929***	−18.176***	−21.565***	−22.785***	0.833	1.178
	(2.788)	(2.919)	(2.990)	(3.073)	(.)	(.)
BDP	−25.934***	−23.194***	−19.979***	−67.435	−43.954	−43.325
	(2.776)	(3.029)	(2.885)	(.)	(.)	(.)
CVP	−39.327	6.861***	6.273	9.708***	29.865***	29.190***
	(.)	(1.999)	(.)	(1.863)	(3.326)	(3.434)
GLP	−60.756	−21.195***	−21.340***	−21.478***	4.888**	1.970
	(.)	(2.967)	(2.957)	(2.979)	(1.821)	(1.894)
SP	−61.293	−25.181***	−26.421***	−59.095	−1.712	−1.374
	(.)	(2.727)	(2.819)	(.)	(1.591)	(1.522)
GPS	−62.264	−23.280***	−61.409	−23.694***	0.415	3.217*
	(.)	(2.891)	(.)	(2.907)	(1.690)	(1.546)
Others	−25.472***	−57.496	−59.321	−58.424	1.193	1.480
	(2.949)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(2.261)	(2.105)
No partisanship	−26.019***	−21.873***	−23.384***	−22.746***	−0.017	−0.252
	(2.367)	(2.619)	(2.661)	(2.657)	(1.579)	(1.587)
CONTROLS						
Left-right	1.539***	0.908***	0.584**	0.746***	0.433**	0.190
	(0.261)	(0.176)	(0.220)	(0.201)	(0.167)	(0.150)
Woman	−0.952	0.008	1.325	0.535	−0.018	−0.132
	(0.894)	(0.610)	(0.748)	(0.703)	(0.548)	(0.518)
Age	−0.036	−0.052*	−0.068*	−0.033	−0.099***	−0.019
	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.022)
Low education	−0.206	−0.422	0.714	0.224	−0.573	0.491
(ref. middle education)	(1.078)	(0.874)	(0.948)	(1.019)	(0.912)	(0.843)
High education	−0.170	−0.103	−0.637	0.415	−0.075	0.571
	(0.831)	(0.650)	(0.818)	(0.784)	(0.613)	(0.621)
Single	0.564	−0.027	−0.955	−0.698	−0.580	0.356
(ref. married)	(0.967)	(0.723)	(0.961)	(0.855)	(0.649)	(0.594)
Widowed	1.941	1.405	1.529	1.191	1.355	0.215
	(1.114)	(0.920)	(1.089)	(1.037)	(0.926)	(0.970)
Constant	18.470	20.435***	22.680***	20.209***	2.162	−1.510
	(.)	(2.270)	(2.731)	(2.640)	(2.171)	(2.075)
N			502			
pseudo R^2			0.65			

Note: Base outcome is SP; standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table A9: Issue-ownership model for Swiss abroad

	SVP	FDP	BDP	CVP	GLP	GPS
			Party choice			
COMPETENCE ASSIGNMENT *(ref. SVP)*						
FDP	−0.454	3.811*	−7.928	2.352	1.586	22.520***
	(1.689)	(1.613)	(.)	(1.740)	(1.770)	(2.309)
BDP	−22.934	22.977	51.641***	−21.734	−21.234	44.733
	(.)	(.)	(2.875)	(.)	(.)	(.)
CVP	−41.742	−0.829	−15.185	3.286	−0.283	−17.330
	(.)	(1.999)	(.)	(1.826)	(2.083)	(.)
GLP	−1.968	0.833	−10.413	−35.142	2.393	21.622***
	(1.869)	(1.495)	(.)	(.)	(1.563)	(2.163)
SP	−4.311**	−2.358	−10.702	−2.357	−2.269	19.310***
	(1.618)	(1.366)	(.)	(1.519)	(1.480)	(2.010)
GPS	−36.105	−0.354	−11.217	−36.479	−0.996	22.717***
	(.)	(1.735)	(.)	(.)	(1.671)	(2.029)
Others	−2.931*	−0.187	24.761***	0.656	−0.772	21.966***
	(1.336)	(1.262)	(2.701)	(1.374)	(1.452)	(1.973)
CONTROLS						
Left-right	1.728***	1.148***	1.123***	0.696***	0.471**	0.133
	(0.246)	(0.169)	(0.293)	(0.169)	(0.154)	(0.145)
Woman	−2.028*	−0.506	−0.692	0.046	−0.481	0.198
	(0.794)	(0.528)	(0.948)	(0.567)	(0.506)	(0.444)
Age	−0.046	−0.034	−0.053	−0.029	−0.098***	−0.021
	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.034)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.019)
Low education	−0.722	0.054	0.805	0.567	−1.848	0.582
(ref. middle education)	(1.013)	(0.842)	(1.494)	(0.843)	(1.077)	(0.812)
High education	0.399	0.821	1.292	0.566	0.215	1.132*
	(0.779)	(0.588)	(1.158)	(0.664)	(0.541)	(0.566)
Single	−0.675	−1.014	1.177	−1.054	−0.621	0.551
(ref. married)	(0.864)	(0.639)	(1.308)	(0.714)	(0.562)	(0.503)
Widowed	0.492	0.526	1.812	−0.244	0.899	0.073
	(1.078)	(0.838)	(1.325)	(0.906)	(0.826)	(0.841)
Constant	−4.933*	−3.668*	−29.757	−2.327	3.078	−22.371***
	(2.278)	(1.823)	(.)	(1.895)	(1.902)	(2.244)
N			429			
pseudo R^2			0.54			

Note: Base outcome is SP; standard errors in parentheses, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$